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COMMENTS
A RIGHT TO PRIVACY TOUR DE FORCE INTO LOUISIANA
MEDICAL INFORMED CONSENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1975, the Louisiana legislature passed the Uniform Consent Law'
to define consent to medical treatment and otherwise generally and
specifically provide for consent to medical treatment.2 The statute es-
tablished the procedure whereby a physician could obtain written or
oral' informed consent from patients. Originally, the Louisiana Supreme
Court interpreted the statute as providing the exclusive means for pur-
suing a cause of action for lack of informed consent, thereby superseding
the jurisprudential rules which previously governed this area.4
In 1988, the Louisiana Supreme Court reinterpreted the statute con-
cluding that it provides only the legislative limits of medical consent.,
The court reinstated the pre-statutory jurisprudential rules to govern
medical informed consent cases. The court based this interpretation, in
part, on a federal and state constitutional right to privacy.6 The court
recognized a patient's right to have before him all the information
constitutionally necessary to make an informed and voluntary consent
before undergoing treatment.
By limiting the Uniform Consent Law and reinstating the pre-stat-
utory jurisprudential doctrine, the court rendered the statute totally
ineffective as an independent force of law. By stripping the statute of
all effect on the basis of the patient's federal and state constitutional
right to privacy, the court in essence declared the statute unconstitutional.
This comment begins by tracing the history of medical informed
consent in Louisiana. Next, this comment seeks to ascertain the federal
and state constitutional right to privacy in the area of medical informed
Copyright 1991, by LOUISUNA LAw REvIEw.
1. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1975 and Supp. 1990).
2. LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039 n.3 (La. 1983).
3. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1975 and Supp. 1990), as amended in 1976.
4. LaCaze, 434 So. 2d at 1039.
5. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
6. Id. at 414-15. The court, in addition, based its interpretation of the Uniform
Consent Law on similar interpretations given by other states construing their informed
consent statutes. Id. The court also based its interpretation on the fact that the statutory
language only says "presumption" which is typically interpreted as a rebuttable pre-
sumption. Id. at 417.
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consent on which the 1988 Louisiana Supreme Court based its authority
in virtually overruling the Louisiana legislature. Finally, the comment
evaluates alternative statutory constructions and the proper expansion
of the constitutional right to privacy into medical informed consent.
II. Tm JURISPRUDENTIAL AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL
INFORMED CONSENT IN LOUISIANA
A. History
The general rule is that a physician must obtain his patient's consent,
expressed or implied, to a medical procedure before performing a pro-
cedure. 7 A patient's cause of action for lack of consent arises in in-
tentional torts, i.e., battery, for the performance of procedures different
from or in excess of those to which he has consented.' A patient's
cause of action for lack of informed consent, however, arises in neg-
ligence. In these situations, the physician performs the procedure to
which his patient consented, but the physician fails to disclose to his
patient certain risks and results involved in the procedure. 9
In 1917, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Theodore v. Ellis ° rec-
ognized a patient's cause of action against his physician for lack of
informed consent to medical treatment. In Theodore, the plaintiff could
7. Coppage v. Gamble, 324 So. 2d 21, 23 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975), writ denied
325 So. 2d 819 (1976); Carroll v. Chapman, 139 So. 2d 61, 65 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962);
Rogers v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 119 So. 2d 649, 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
8. Pizzalotto, M.D., Ltd. v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859 (La. 1983).
9. Hodge v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 399 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Percle
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied
350 So. 2d 1218 (1977). Louisiana has categorized a suit based on the lack of informed
consent as a cause of action based in negligence and not assault and battery, i.e. an
intentional tort, for several reasons. First, the act involved in these cases does not fit the
traditional concepts of battery, i.e., an intentional touching or striking of another person.
For example, a battery would occur from the unauthorized removal of an organ but no
battery should occur from the failure to adequately advise a patient about a certain
treatment. Second, the failure to inform a patient usually does not involve an intent by
the physician to injure or a substantial certainty that injury is likely to result, which is
essential for an intentional tort. Third, the lack of informed consent is not compatible
with the traditional idea of "contact" or "touching" because in the typical situation the
physician impeccably performs the procedure and the complaints involve the personal
reactions to the procedure which are unanticipated by the patient. Fourth, the question
arises as to whether or not a physician's malpractice insurance covers liability for arguably
the criminal act of battery. Fifth, these cases do not fit the traditional mold of situations
wherein punitive damages should be awarded. Following from these expressed reasons,
Louisiana has adopted the approach that cases involving lack of medical informed consent
will be handled as causes of action in negligence and not assault and battery. Percle, 349
So. 2d at 1298 (citing Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis.2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973)).
10. 141 La. 709, 75 So. 655 (La. 1917).
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not retain urine in his bladder at night. The physician performed an
operation which opened and drained the patient's bladder. The patient
consented to the operation and the physician performed the operation
within the proper medical standard of care. The physician performed a
second operation which removed part of the prostate gland of the patient.
The physician performed the operation under the proper medical standard
of care but failed to explain to the patient the object of the second
operation or the available alternative procedures. The court held that
the patient had the right to know the purpose of the proposed operation
and the alternative procedures available so the patient could decide
whether to undergo the operation.'
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Consent Law, the jurispru-
dence continued to develop the elements for a patient's cause of action
against a physician for lack of informed consent. This cause of action
included the normal elements involved in a suit for negligence: duty,
breach of duty, causation, and damages. 2
11. Id. at 723, 75 So. at 660.
12. LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039, 1044 (La. 1983). The physician owed a duty
to the patient to inform him of his particular ailment, or condition, the general nature
of the proposed treatment or procedure, the material risks involved in the proposed
treatment or procedure, the prospects of success, the risks of failing or refusing to undergo
the procedure or any procedure, and the risks and availability of alternative procedures.
The doctor's duty included the duty to disclose all risks which are "material." A material
risk was that to which a reasonable person, in what the doctor knows or should know
to be the patient's position, would attach significance in deciding whether or not to
undergo or forego the proposed treatment. The determination of whether or not a risk
was material was a two-step process. The first step required medical expert testimony to
decide whether the risk was material taking into account the likelihood of the risk occurring
and the severity of the risk. The second step of materiality was for the trier of fact,
absent expert testimony, to determine whether the probability and severity of the risk
occurring was a risk which a reasonable person would consider in undergoing or foregoing
the treatment. The cause of action also required a causal connection between the doctor's
failure to disclose the material risk and damage to the patient. Louisiana had adopted
an objective standard of causation: whether a reasonable patient in this plaintiff's position
would have consented to the treatment had the material information and risks been
disclosed. Finally, damages must have actually occurred to the patient. The patient carried
the burden of proof and persuasion regarding these elements of the cause of action.
As a defense, the physician had a privilege not to disclose material risks in two instances,
First, the doctor did not have to disclose material risks when an emergency arose because
the patient was unconscious or otherwise unable to consent, and harm from a failure to
treat was imminent and outweighed the harm threatened by the proposed treatment.
Second, the doctor had a therapeutic privilege not to disclose material risks when the
doctor reasonably believed that disclosure would cause illness or emotional distress to the
patient so as to prevent a patient from exercising a rational decision, to complicate or
hinder treatment, or to pose psychological damage to the patient. The physician carried
the burden of proof in establishing that the existence of the privilege not to disclose
existed. See Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 411-13 (La. 1988); Percle v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289, 1299 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied
350 So. 2d 1218 (1977).
1991]
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In 1975, the Louisiana legislature enacted the Uniform Consent
Law, 3 which describes the procedure involved in consent to medical
treatment. In LaCaze v. Collier,4 the Louisiana Supreme Court inter-
preted the Uniform Consent Law as providing the only valid, legal
procedures for obtaining an informed consent.
In LaCaze, the patient suffered from inflammation of the tissues
and organs in the pelvic area. The physician performed a hysterectomy.
Following the operation, the patient lost bladder control and developed
a vesico-vaginal fistula. 5 The patient sued the physician for the phy-
sician's failure to obtain the patient's informed consent to the operation.
The patient had signed two written consent forms prior to the operation.
The written forms did not fulfill Subsection A of the Uniform Consent
Law because the forms failed to provide any details of the operation
13. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1975 and Supp. 1990). The statute provides:
A. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, written consent to medical
treatment means a consent in writing to any medical or surgical procedure or
course of procedures which (a) sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose
of the procedure or procedures, together with the known risks, if any, of death,
brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any
organ or limb, of disfiguring scars associated with such procedure or procedures,
(b) acknowledges that such disclosure of information has been made and that
all questions asked about the procedure or procedures have been answered in
a satisfactory manner, and (c) is signed by the patient for whom the procedure
is to be performed, or if the patient for any reason lacks legal capacity to
consent by a person who has legal authority to consent on behalf of such
patient in such circumstances. Such consent shall be presumed to be valid and
effective, in the absence of proof that execution of the consent was induced by
misrepresentation of material facts.
B. Except as provided in Subsection A of this Section, no evidence shall be
admissible to modify or limit the authorization for performance of the procedure
or procedures set forth in such a written consent.
C. Where consent to medical treatment from a patient, or from a person
authorized by law to consent to medical treatment for such patient, is secured
other than in accordance with Subsection A above, the explanation to the patient
or to the person consenting for such a patient shall include the matters set
forth in Paragraph (a) of Subsection A above, and an opportunity shall be
afforded for asking questions concerning the procedures to be performed which
shall be answered in a satisfactory manner. Such consent shall be valid and
effective and is subject to proof according to the rules of evidence in ordinary
cases.
14. 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983).
15. Id. at 1041 n.2. A fistula is an abnormal opening between two organs of the
body, in this case between the bladder and the vagina. The usual cause of a vesico-
vaginal fistula forming is a stitch that may be inadvertently taken into the bladder during
the closing of the vaginal cuff .... [Iln time, the stitch would pull through the bladder
wall. Other possible causes are nicking the bladder with the knife or damaging the blood
supply to a portion of the bladder wall with a blunt instrument or clamp. Vesico-vaginal
fistulae typically measure only a few millimeters in size, and, once formed, retain their
initial size until corrected.
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or describe the related risks. The physician also failed to obtain an oral
consent under Subsection C because he failed to disclose to the patient
the known risk of loss of function of an organ. The known risk of the
possible occurrence of a vesico-vaginal fistula is considered loss of
function of the bladder. The physician, however, escaped liability because
the patient failed to prove the causation element. The one in two hundred
chance of the vesico-vaginal fistula occurring and the easy remedying
of such a problem would not have prevented an objectively reasonable
patient from undergoing the operation.' 6
Based on the statutory language "[niotwithstanding any other law
to the contrary . . .," the court concluded that the statute explicitly
provided the exclusive methods for obtaining a valid medical informed
consent.' 7 The statute expressly included the only legally valid informed
consents-written consent pursuant to Subsection A and oral consent
pursuant to Subsection C.18 A valid consent to medical treatment had
to conform to the statute, regardless of the differences between the
statute and the previously established jurisprudential rules. For example,
prior to the statute, courts required the physician to discuss alternative
treatments with the patient. The statute does not require such disclosure
for a valid informed consent. The statute, on the other hand, is broader
than the jurisprudence by requiring disclosure of all known risks, material
or not, possible in the proposed treatment and listed in the statute. The
jurisprudence required the disclosure of only the material risks, deter-
mined by the likelihood of the risks occurring, the severity of the risks,
and the significance that a reasonable person would attach to the risks.' 9
The statute, therefore, superseded the former jurisprudential rules
on medical informed consent. 20 If the physician satisfied the statutory
requirements, the patient's signature created a presumption of validity.
No evidence was admissible to modify or limit the authorization provided
in the written form, except evidence of misrepresentation.2 '
16. Id. at 1046-49.




21. Id. Since LaCaze, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal has consistently
held that when a patient gives written consent to medical treatment pursuant to the
Uniform Consent Law, no other evidence is admissible to modify or limit the consent
except by evidence proving that the consent was induced by misrepresentation. This court
has adhered to the holding that a written consent which tracks the language of the statute
constitutes informed consent, even if the written consent form only provides the general
language of the statute as long as the occurring risk falls within those categories. The
written consent form, also, is valid even if the patient did not read it as long as the
patient signed it, in the absence of coercion or force. The only basis for overcoming the
consent as established by the written consent form is to allege and prove misrepresentation
1991]
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In 1988, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher2
departed from its own decision in LaCaze interpreting the Uniform
Consent Law. In Hondroulis, the patient experienced pain in her lower
back which radiated down her right hip and leg. The physician performed
a myelogram and lumbar laminectomy upon the patient. After the
operation, the patient lost bladder control. The patient sued the physician
for the physician's failure to obtain the patient's informed consent. Prior
to the operation, the patient signed a written consent form tracking the
language of the statute. The trial court and court of appeal,23 relying
on the existing jurisprudence, granted summary judgment to the phy-
sician. These courts held that a written consent form tracking the lan-
guage of the statute constituted a valid informed consent, rebuttable
only by facts of misrepresentation of which none existed. u
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, concluding
that the "informed consent doctrine is based on the principle that every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done to his or her own body.' '2 The court cited the
United States Supreme Court cases recognizing an individual's right to
privacy in various areas of a person's life. 26 Although the court rec-
ognized that the United States Supreme Court has not yet extended the
right to privacy to an individual's decision to obtain or reject medical
treatment, the court held that the federal Constitution's right to privacy
includes such a decision. The court cited one lower federal court case
and numerous state court cases in support of this contention.2 7
The court, with little state authority, then incorporated Louisiana
constitutional law into its decision. The court stated that article I, section
by the physician to the patient. Although the cases do not define misrepresentation, the
cases suggests that the physician must actually manifest an overt, false communication to
the patient, which is supported by the general legal definition of misrepresentation. In
this light, the physician must disclaim a known risk involved or assert some other false
statement to the patient. In the absence of evidence of misrepresentation, the court will
not consider nor admit other evidence into the court in opposition to the physician's
motion for directed verdict. See Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 521 So. 2d 534 (La. App.
4th Cir.), rev'd 553 So. 2d 398 (1988); Leiva v. Nance 506 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied 512 So. 2d 1176 (1987); Madere v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 505 So. 2d
146 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); Leonhard v. New Orleans East Orthopedic Clinic, 485 So.
2d 1008 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied 489 So. 2d 919 (1986).
22. Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 398.
23. Hondroulis, 521 So. 2d at 534.
24. Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 401. See also Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 411 (on
reh'g).
25. Id. at 411. See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064, 93 S. Ct. 560 (1972); LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (La.
1983); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).




5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 expressly guarantees that "[e]very
person shall be secure in his person ... against unreasonable ...
invasions of privacy. ' 2 Thus, the court concluded "that the Louisiana
[C]onstitution's right to privacy also provides for a right to decide
whether to obtain or reject medical treatment.' '29
The Hondroulis court held that the prior jurisprudence construing
the statute to provide an irrebuttable presumption of informed consent
absent misrepresentation when a physician traces the statute's language
in a consent form and a patient signs that form was unconstitutional.
The Hondroulis court stated that the LaCaze court's statutory inter-
pretation was overly broad in view of the constitutional dimension of
the informed consent doctrine.30 The Hondroulis court concluded that
the LaCaze opinion would not be impaired by deleting the LaCaze
interpretation of the statute, reducing the LaCaze statutory interpretation
to dictum.31 The Hondroulis court held this prior statutory interpretation
violative of the patient's federal and state constitutional right to make
an intelligent and voluntary decision regarding medical treatment by
limiting access to information essential to a meaningful decision regarding
the proposed treatment.3 2 The prior statutory interpretation was uncon-
stitutional and did not serve compelling state interests33 necessary to
overcome the protected individual liberties involved.3 4 The court, in
addition, recognized that other states had enacted similar legislation in
this area at approximately the same time as Louisiana and that this
interpretation of the Louisiana statute was more consistent with the
interpretations which the other states gave to their informed consent
statutes.
35
When a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which
will render it unconstitutional and the other of which will render it
constitutional, the court will adopt the interpretation of the statute which,
without doing violence to its language, will maintain its constitution-
28. Id at 415. See also La. Const. Art. I, § 5.
29. Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 415.
30. Id. at 417.
31. Id. at 417-18.
32. Id. at 416.
33. The purported state interests include: (1) maintaining medical standards and
protecting health, (2) decreasing the number of fraudulent medical claims by regulating
the proof of informed consent, (3) reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance,
(4) attracting and retaining medical talent and the delivering of adequate medical services
within the state, and (5) by providing certainty in the law in the area of medical informed
consent by providing health care providers with guidelines. Id. See also Hondroulis v.
Schuhmacher, 521 So. 2d 534, 536 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd 553 So. 2d 398 (1988).
34. Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 416.
35. Id. at 418.
19911
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ality.3 6 The court held that the constitutional interpretation of the statute
provided a rebuttable presumption instead of an irrebuttable presump-
tion. The court concluded that the legislature, by enacting the statute,
did not intend to make substantial alterations in the informed consent
doctrine developed by the jurisprudence.37 The statute was a limited,
distinct consent doctrine which detailed the legislative limits of consent
to medical treatment. The statute, furthermore, in no way encroached
upon the jurisprudential informed consent doctrine which was still in
effect and essential to an informed and intelligent decision regarding
proposed medical treatment.3 8 Thus, a suit in Louisiana based on a
cause of action for lack of informed consent now requires the pre-
statutory elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.
B. Analysis
The difference between a statutory irrebuttable presumption of in-
formed consent and a rebuttable presumption of consent is paramount
to the independence and effectiveness of the statute. The legislature
intended to provide a shield for health-care personnel from suits based
on lack of informed consent and to reduce the number of awards
insurance companies pay for physicians.3 9 Absent claims of unconsti-
tutionality, the LaCaze court's interpretation fulfills the legislative aims
by construing the statute as a legislative doctrine on informed consent,
replacing the prior jurisprudential rules.
In most negligence suits, the plaintiff must carry the burden of
proof in establishing his claim in order to prevail. The defendant,
therefore, is granted procedurally a presumption that he is free from
fault because the plaintiff carries the burden of proof. If the Uniform
Consent Law establishes only a rebuttable presumption which the patient
can overcome by proving the jurisprudential elements, the statute does
not provide the physician with any greater protection than that which
usually flows to a defendent in a negligence suit. If the statute, on the
other hand, provides an irrebuttable presumption absent misrepresen-
tation, the physician is provided with greater protection. Under the
Hondroulis interpretation, the statute provides nothing to the physician;
therefore, the statute is totally forceless as an independent source of
law. The LaCaze interpretation, on the other hand, gives the statute
substantive effect.
36. Id. at 416-17.
37. Id. at 418.
38. Id. at 419.
39. Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 Tul. L.
Rev. 655, 676 (1976).
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The LaCaze interpretation would also permit a physician to move
for summary judgment based on the .fact that he obtained a statutory
informed consent. A motion for summary judgment based upon an
irrebuttable presumption requires only proof of the foundation facts for
the establishment of the presumption. 40 The court would award summary
judgment in the case in which the physician obtained a statutory informed
consent, usually evidenced by a written form. The patient, furthermore,
could not admit any evidence, except evidence of misrepresentation, to
contradict the written form.4 '
The Hondroulis interpretation, however, does not provide the basis
for summary judgment. This interpretation establishes only a rebuttable
presumption of consent and permits the plaintiff to easily overcome the
presumption by proving the old jurisprudential elements of informed
consent. Under this theory, summary judgment is only available if there
is no genuine issue of fact both as to whether the physician disclosed
all material facts of the therapy to the patient and as to whether the
patient was aware of the risk and assented to encounter it.42 Since the
statutory consent is considered rebuttable, and not irrebuttable, the
patient can frequently allege nondisclosure or unawareness to rebut the
presumption. The plaintiff, in addition, can introduce evidence outside
of the written form to support his allegations. Since the facts before
the court are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion, the allegations of nondisclosure and the admission of other
evidence outside the written form will frequently prevent a finding of
no genuine issue of fact. The plaintiff, therefore, will frequently over-
come the rebuttable presumption and prevent the granting of summary
judgment. 4
This interpretation of the statute by the Hondroulis court does not
give any substance to the statute. Instead, this interpretation leaves the
40. Stone Oil Corp. v. Acadiana Consulting & Inv., 448 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1984).
41. See Madere v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 505 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
A court will properly grant a motion for summary judgment when the pleadings, dep-
ositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Since the mover carries the burden of establishing that
no material factual issue exists, the inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in
the material before the court must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, the
opposing party may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings but he must respond
with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not, summary
judgment shall be rendered against him. See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 966 (B), 967;
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 420 (La. 1988).
42. Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 420.
43. Stone Oil Corp., 448 So. 2d at 901.
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statute skeletal by ignoring it and rendering it totally ineffectual by
reinstating the prior jurisprudence to decide medical informed consent
cases. The court based this interpretation of the statute on the recognized
federal constitutional right to privacy and the Louisiana constitutional
right to privacy provision found in article 1, section 5. In light of the
court's interpretation and its effect on the statute, an analysis of the
existence of a federal and state right to privacy in the area of medical
informed consent is warranted.
III. TI CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. United States Constitution
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly establish
any right of privacy, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that one aspect of the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment
is "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones
of privacy." This constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" includes
"the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions." ' 45 Although the Court has not marked the outer limits of
this aspect of privacy, it is clear that an individual may make personal
decisions without unjustified government interference pertaining to mar-
riage," procreation, 7 contraception," family relationships, 49 and child
rearing and education. 0
Thi right to privacy, however, is not absolute.' The constitutionally
recognized right to privacy does not automatically invalidate every state
regulation which affects the particular liberty interest protected. 2 Where
certain fundamental rights to privacy are involved, regulations limiting
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726, reh'g denied, 410 U.S.
959, 93 S. Ct. 1409 (1973). See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
684, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016 (1977); Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 414 (La.
1988).
45. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 97 S. Ct. 869, 876 (1977); see also Carey,
431 U.S. at 684, 97 S. Ct. at 2016; Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 414.
46. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967). See also Carey, 431 U.S.
at 685, 97 S. Ct. at 2016; Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 414.
47. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942).
48. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972).
49. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944).
50. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923). See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, reh'g
denied 410 U.S. 959, 93 S. Ct. 1409 (1973); Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398,
414 (La. 1988).
51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
52. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685-86, 97 S. Ct. at 2016; Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 415.
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these rights may be justified only by compelling state interests and must
be narrowly drawn to express only those interests."
Although one lower federal court 4 and numerous state courts" have
held that the federal constitution contains a fundamental right to decide
whether to obtain or reject medical treatment, the United States Supreme
Court has not so held. In 1980, the United States District Court of the
Southern District of Texas held in Andrews v. Ballard 6 that the pro-
visions of the Texas Medical Practice Act, which contained regulations
that operated to limit the practice of acupuncture to licensed physicians,
impermissibly interfered with a patient's federal constitutional right to
decide whether to obtain or reject medical treatment. The court found
that the patients were unable to find any licensed physicians in the state
who were skilled in the practice of acupuncture; therefore, the Texas
regulations not only substantially limited the plaintiffs' access to acu-
puncture treatment but virtually prohibited the decision entirely. The
statute did promote compelling state interests in preventing against mis-
diagnosis, improperly administered acupuncture treatment, and delay in
remedying any complications. These interests, however, were not drawn
narrowly enough since other means were available to accomplish these
interests without unduly burdening the individual's right to obtain ac-
upuncture treatment.
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,7 the United
States Supreme Court recognized that it has never interpreted the federal
Constitution to encompass the right to refuse medical treatment within
53. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155, 93 S.Ct. at 728. See also Carey, 431 U.S. at
686, 97 S. Ct. at 2016; Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 415.
54. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tx. 1980).
55. Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987);
Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchur), 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist. 1986); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482
A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. 1984); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d
1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1978), aff'd
379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Rumple v. Bloomington Hosp., 422 N.E.2d 1309 (Ind. App.
1981); Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa App. 1982); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629,
405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1989); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S. Ct. 310
(1976); In re Farrell, 212 N.J. Super. 294, 514 A.2d 1342 (Sup. Ct. Chancery Div. Ocean
County 1986), aff'd 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); Leach v. Akron General
Med. Center, 68 Ohio Misc., 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds 13 Ohio App.3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio App. 1984); In re Welfare of
Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983) rev'd on other grounds 102 Wash.2d
810, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984).
56. 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tx. 1980).
57. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
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the generalized right to privacy.a Guardians of a patient, who was in
a persistent vegetative state, sought termination of the artificial hydration
and nutrition which was sustaining the patient. The Court did not
acknowledge the existence of a federal constitutional right to privacy of
an individual to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition. The Court,
for purposes of this case, did "assume" that the federal Constitution
incorporated such a right in order that it could answer the more limited
question brought before it.19 Since an incompetent person could not
make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise this hypothetical
right to refuse treatment, a surrogate or guardian could elect to have
the hydration and nutrition withdrawn. The issue involved was whether
the United States Constitution forbids the establishment of clear and
convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes to withdraw medical
treatment before permitting the withdrawal. The Court held that it did
not. The Supreme Court did not establish a federal constitutional right
to privacy regarding a decision to obtain or refuse medical treatment,
but decided the case on a narrower issue-procedural due process in
permitting a guardian to withdraw medical treatment from a patient in
a persistent vegetative state.60
The majority of cases determining the existence of a right to privacy
focus on the right to obtain or reject medical treatment regarding a
patient's desire to terminate life-sustaining treatment. The United States
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rush v. Miller" dealt directly with
the informed consent issue and held that the United States Constitution
does not contain a right to privacy in the area of medical informed
consent.6 2 The plaintiff challenged the validity of the Tennessee medical
informed consent statute63 because the statute failed to require disclosure
of all hazards which might result from a proposed operation. The statute
required only the disclosure of those hazards which would be disclosed
in accordance with the community standards of others in the medical
community concerned with the same or similar operations. The court
sustained the constitutionality of the Tennessee statute because it failed
to find any language in the United States Constitution or any medical
malpractice case decided by the United States Supreme Court which
established a general right to privacy in the area of medical informed
consent."
58. Id. at 2851 n.7.
59. Id. at 2852.
60. Id.
61. Rush v. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1981).
62. Id. at 1076.
63. Tenn Code Ann. § 23-3417 (1975). See also Tenn Code Ann. § 29-26-118 (1980).
64. Rush, 648 F.2d at 1076.
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Incorporating a federal constitutional right to privacy in this area,
many state courts65 have worked from the premise that the common
law informed consent doctrine provides a patient with a jurisprudentially
created right to be free from nonconsensual invasions of one's bodily
integrity. These state cases are not typical informed consent cases like
Hondroulis and LaCaze but instead involve situations in which a patient
seeks the right to terminate his life by discontinuing life-sustaining
treatment. These state courts hold that the common law right requires
physicians to provide the material information relevant to the proposed
medical treatment to the patient." Thus, the patient's right to give an
informed refusal to medical treatment is a corollary of the right to give
an informed consent to medical treatment.6 7 A patient's right to refuse
medical treatment, even at the risk of personal injury or death, is
primarily protected by the common law. Many states, in addition, have
extended the protection of the federal constitutional right to privacy to
a patient's decision to obtain or reject medical treatment in cases in-
volving a patient's decision to terminate his life. 6
The United States Supreme Court has not incorporated this right
to die privacy claim into the federal Constitution but recognizes its
legitimacy based on the common law doctrine of informed consent. 69
The state cases establishing this privacy right in the federal Constitution,
therefore, carry little authority because the United States Supreme Court
has not acknowledged such a right.
Assuming that a constitutional right to privacy does exist in the
area of medical informed consent, the Uniform Consent Law should
still withstand a constitutional challenge because it merely impinges upon
rather than unduly burdens a constitutional right. A regulation that
unduly burdens a constitutional right must be justified by a compelling
state interest.70 A regulation which merely impinges upon a constitutional
right without unduly burdening it, on the other hand, will withstand
constitutional scrutiny if the regulation reasonably furthers a proper state
purpose. 7
65. See Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987);
In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); In re Welfare of Colyer, 99
Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
66. See In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash.2d at 119, 660 P.2d at 743.
67. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. at 335, 529 A.2d at 410.
68. Id.
69. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1990).
70. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010 (1977); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 reh'g denied 410 U.S. 959, 93 S. Ct. 1409 (1973);
Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529, 537 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
71. Scheinberg, 482 F. Supp. at 537. See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831 (1976). Compare Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-89, 97 S. Ct. at 2017-
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The Louisiana Uniform Consent Law does not deny to any individual
the right to seek medical treatment. The patient can refuse treatment,
can undergo treatment, or can seek other medical opinions. The statute
only regulates the relationship between the patient and the physician.
By enacting this statute, the legislature has pronounced a public policy
to supplement the usual contract or tort relationship between the phy-
sician and patient. If a patient has a right to privacy, this right is not
unduly burdened by the statute since the patient still retains the decision
whether to submit himself to medical treatment. This right, on the other
hand, is only impinged upon because the legislature has acted only to
affect the relationship between the physician and the patient and not
to deny the patient the ability to exercise his choice regarding medical
treatment.
Since the patient's right to privacy is only impinged upon and not
unduly burdened, the statute will withstand constitutional scrutiny if it
reasonably relates to a rational state purpose. 72 The state's interests in
enacting the statute include: (1) maintaining medical standards and pro-
tecting the public health, (2) decreasing the number of frivolous and
fraudulent medical claims, (3) reducing the cost of medical malpractice
insurance, (4) attracting and retaining medical talent and the delivery
of adequate medical services within the state,"3 and (5) providing certainty
in the law in the area of medical informed consent by providing health
18 with Carey, 431 U.S. at 705-06, 97 S. Ct. at 2026 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In several cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that government may validly
choose to favor childbirth over abortion and a government may implement that choice
by funding medical services relating to childbirth but not those relating to abortion. In
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977), the Supreme Court upheld a statute
which provided financial support to individuals seeking childbirth services and denying
such financial support for certain abortion procedures. The Court stated that "there is
a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy." Id. at 475,
97 S. Ct. at 2383. The Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae and Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services also upheld governmental action which unequally subsidized abortion and
other medical services, in favor of the latter. In these cases the Court recognized that
the regulations in question may hamper or impede women in exercising their right of
privacy in seeking abortions. The Court, however, concluded that these regulations en-
couraged alternative activity deemed in the public interest and placed no affirmative
governmental obstacle in the path of women to obtain abortion services. The Court
concluded that the practical effects of such regulations were constitutionally irrelevant.
See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct. 2671, reh'g denied 448 U.S. 917, 101 S. Ct. 39 (1980); Maher,
432 U.S. at 464, 97 S. Ct. at 2376; State of N.Y. v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. granted 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
72. See Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529, 537 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
73. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 416 (La. 1988).
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care providers with guidelines.7 4 These state interests satisfy a rational
state purpose, and the statute reasonably relates to the state interests.
In this light, the statute should withstand federal constitutional scrutiny.
The United States Constitution has not been interpreted to guarantee
a right to privacy in either right to die or medical informed consent
cases. Most state decisions, however, simultaneously base the right to
refuse medical treatment on a state constitutional right to privacy pro-
vision or recognized right. A state constitution can grant greater indi-
vidual protections and liberties than those provided by the federal
Constitution. The Louisiana State Constitution of 1974, therefore, may
provide a right to privacy to individuals in medical informed consent
cases.
B. Louisiana State Constitution
In 1974, Louisiana enacted a new state constitution which includes
a right to privacy provision. Article 1, section 5 provides:
Section 5. Every person shall be secure in his person, property,
communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall
issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons
or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for
the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure
conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to
raise its illegality in the appropriate court . 7 (Emphasis added).
Little concrete evidence exists supporting the premise that the Louis-
iana State Constitution provides a right to privacy in the field of medical
informed consent. The best evidence is the literal wording of article 1,
section 5 of the constitution which guarantees the right of every person
to be secure against unreasonable invasions of privacy. The records of
the constitutional convention, however, provide little insight into the
extent of this right. The convention records regarding article 1, section
20, which provides that "no law shall subject any person to euthanasia,"
suggest that Louisiana does recognize an individual's right to decide
whether to obtain or reject medical treatment.
Based on a purely statutory comparison of sister states' statutes,
the Hondroulis court misinterpreted the Louisiana statute to reach an
interpretation consistent, it felt, with the statutes of other states which
passed similar legislation at approximately the same time. The greater
74. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 521 So. 2d 534, 536 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd 553
So. 2d 398 (1988).
75. La. Const. art. 1, § 5.
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privacy right granted by the Louisiana constitution as compared to that
granted by the other states' constitutions, however, provides more sup-
port for the Hondroulis court's interpretation of the Uniform Consent
Law.
1. Language of the Provision
The change in the 1974 constitutional provision from its corollary
provision in the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 is evidence of an ex-
pansion of the right to privacy into the civil arena.76 The 1921 provision
contained the langliage "secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures" to which the 1974
provision adds protection of property and communications against un-
reasonable invasions of privacy.77 The 1974 provision explicitly incor-
porates into the Louisiana constitution the right to privacy established
by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut s instead
of relying on reasoning from other provisions for its establishment,
which occurs with the federal Constitution. 79 Although the provision
explicitly recognizes a right to privacy in the field of civil law, the
constitutional convention's intent to expand this right into the medical
informed consent area is questionable.
2. Intent of the Constitutional Convention
The convention evidently intended to provide for a right to privacy
both in the areas of criminal and civil law. In the criminal arena, the
provision guarantees the traditional right to privacy against unreasonable
searches and seizures as well as expanding those traditional rightsA° The
convention records explain that the major difference between the 1921
provision and the 1974 provision is the addition of the last sentence to
the new constitution." The last sentence added "[a]ny person adversely
affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section
shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court."8 s2
Delegate Roy explained the provision as permitting anyone adversely
affected by an unreasonable search to go to court before trial and
76. Hargrave, Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La.
L. Rev. 1, 20 (1974).
77. Id. at 21.
78. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
79. Hargrave, supra note 76, at 20-21.
80. Id. at 20.
81. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Tran-
scripts, Vol. VI, 1072.
82. La. Const. art. 1, § 5.
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attempt to suppress the illegally obtained evidence. 3 Roy believed that
this sentence did not cover civil law suits relating to an aggrieved person
seeking relief from illegal police conduct." Delegate Schmitt believed
the entire provision extended protection further than the federal Con-
stitution to protect against illegal private conduct as well as illegal state
conduct. 5
More important to the issue at hand, the convention may have
sought to establish an affirmative right to privacy in non-criminal areas
of the law."6 Delegate Ware, contrary to Delegate Roy, expressed his
belief that the last sentence was intended to create a civil cause of action
for citizens who were the victims of illegal police conduct, such as illegal
searches and seizures. 7 The records of the constitutional convention
disclose little more about how broadly the delegates intended this right
to privacy provision to extend.
Ironically, the medical community praised the breadth of the pro-
vision in protecting generally the patient-physician relationship.88 The
Louisiana State Medical Society emphasized its patient-physician con-
fidentiality as expressed in its Oath of Hippocrates and section 9 of the
Principles of Medical Ethics.89 The medical community even sought to
add specific wording to the provision which would protect explicitly the
privacy of confidential communications and records between physicians
and patients. 90
This section has provided a foundation for constitutional develop-
ment regarding the right to privacy in tort law as well as non-criminal
aspects of government operations. 9' In Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal,
Inc.,92 the Crowley Post-Signal published a photograph of the Jaubert
home which appeared above the caption, "One of Crowley's stately
homes, a bit weatherworn and unkempt .... " 91 The Louisiana Supreme
Court acknowledged the existence of a Louisiana constitutional civil
right to privacy in article 1, section 5.9 The court, however, held that
83. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Tran-
scripts, Vol. VI, 1075.
84. Id. at 1076.
85. Id.
86. Hargrave, supra note 76, at 20.
87. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Tran-
scripts, Vol. VI, 1072.
88. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Tran-
scripts, Vol. X, 159.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Hargrave, supra note 76, at 21.
92. 375 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1979).
93. Id. at 1387.
94. Id. at 1389 n.4.
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the plaintiff had no right to privacy regarding the home and its condition.
The court reasoned that the home was plainly visible from the public
street and any passerby could see the same view of the property as that
published by the defendant. 9
In Roshto v. Hebert,96 the supreme court again recognized the ex-
istence of the right to privacy in article 1, section 5 in a civil suit.
97
The plaintiffs sued The Iberville South newspaper for publishing a
reproduction of a twenty-five year old article which described the details
of the plaintiffs' past criminal convictions. The reproduction was part
of a regular feature of the newspaper which published the original front
pages from randomly selected twenty-five year old editions of the news-
paper. The court did not impose liability on the newspaper because the
publication was truthful, accurate, and non-malicious.
98
Although the court has acknowledged the existence of the Louisiana
constitutional right to privacy, the question remains as to the extent of
this right. Because the convention records are silent regarding information
relevant for purposes of this comment, an analysis into a related con-
stitutional provision may provide a better understanding of the rela-
tionship between the state constitutional right to privacy and medical
informed consent.
3. The Right to Die in Louisiana
The Louisiana Constitution includes a prohibition against a law
subjecting a person to euthanasia. article 1, section 20 provides "No
law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel,
excessive, or unusual punishment. Full rights of citizenship shall be
restored upon termination of state and federal supervision following
conviction for any offense. ' 99
This provision was intended to prevent the state legislature from
ever passing a law which would allow a person or persons to determine
whether another person should be allowed to die or be put to death.100
Delegate Fontenot wanted to exclude constitutionally power from the
Louisiana legislature which the Florida legislature had in 1973 recently
95. Id. at 1391.
96. 439 So. 2d 428 (La. 1983).
97. Id. at 430 n.l.
98. Id. at 432.
99. La. Const. art. 1, § 20 (1974).
100. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Tran-
scripts, Vol. VII, 1191.
See La. R.S. 40:1299.56 (1990). The legislature, however, does provide a mechanism,




exercised.' 0' The Florida legislature had passed a bill that not only
allowed voluntary euthanasia but also allowed three physicians to decree
and execute a death sentence with the approval of a circuit judge on
anyone whose life had become meaningless as the bill expressed it.' 2
The delegates intended the Louisiana provision to prohibit the state from
determining for a person whether his life was worth living. 03 The con-
vention did intend to allow each individual the right to determine for
himself whether to reject medical treatment and choose to die. °4
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Hondroulis did not acknowledge
the existence of this provision when concluding that the Louisiana con-
stitution included a right to privacy which protects a patient's decision
whether to obtain or reject medical treatment. 0 The right to accept or
reject medical treatment, which usually includes the right to die, is a
step away from the patient's right regarding medical informed consent.
The right to accept or reject medical treatment is a greater privacy right
because the patient is deciding whether or not to undergo treatment at
all, and this decision commonly involves a decision whether or not to
terminate one's own life. Medical informed consent involves those cases
in which the patient has already consented to undergo the medical
treatment and later sues for the failure of the physician to provide him
with all the material information concerning the procedure, although
the procedure was performed with the requisite degree of skill.
Article 1, section 20 incorporates the greater privacy right regarding
euthanasia, or the right to die. The convention records on this section
would lend support to a privacy right in the medical informed consent
area. This section, however, does not provide a general privacy right
as does section 5. The convention records on the euthanasia provision
may provide evidence that the convention recognized a medical privacy
right in the declaration of rights portion of the constitution as a whole.
Thus, the convention may have contemplated the inclusion of such a
medical privacy right into the general privacy provision of section 5.
4. Other Jurisdictions
When the Louisiana legislature passed the Uniform Consent Law in
1975, other state legislatures passed similar laws in an attempt to protect
health-care providers from suits based on lack of informed consent and
101. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Tran-
scripts, Vol. VII, 1195.
102. Id.
103. Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention: Convention Transcripts, Vol.
VII, 1191-1200.
104. Id.
105. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
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thus reduce the number of awards insurance companies pay for phy-
sicians.'0 The history of the jurisprudence and the literal wording of
the statute in each state is important to the proper interpretation of
each state's medical informed consent statute. Statutory interpretation,
furthermore, is governed by each state's constitution. These state statutes
fall typically into two categories.
The first category includes New York and Florida which have general
statutes codifying the jurisprudential doctrine of informed consent. °7
New York and Florida courts have properly interpreted their statutes
as codifications of their prior jurisprudential medical informed consent
principles. Louisiana, on the other hand, intended to provide a distinct
legislative doctrine in this area, superseding its existing jurisprudence on
medical informed consent. Although the Hondroulis court acknowledged
that the Louisiana statute does not codify the prior jurisprudence in
Louisiana, the court, based on an individual's constitutional right, su-
perseded the exclusive sphere of the legislature by reinstating the prior
jurisprudence as taking precedence over the principles established in the
statute. Since the language of the New York and Florida statutes does
not mirror the language of the Louisiana statute, the interpretation of
the New York and Florida statutes should not mirror the interpretation
of the Louisiana statute.
The second category includes Ohio and Georgia which have more
specific legislatively-developed doctrines of informed consent which over-
rule the prior jurisprudential doctrine in this area.108 Ohio and Georgia
courts have interpreted their statutes as rejecting the prior jurisprudential
medical informed consent doctrine and instituting a distinct, legislative
doctrine in this field. The Hondroulis court, however, retained the prior
jurisprudential medical informed consent doctrine in Louisiana rather
106. Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 Tul. L.
Rev. 655, 676 (1976).
See Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 407 (dissenting opinion in original hearing), 418 (on
reh'g). Justice Dennis, in interpreting the Louisiana statute, emphasized the similarity of
the statutes passed in other states at the same time as Louisiana passed its statute.
107. See N.Y. [Pub. Health) Law § 2805-d (McKinney 1985); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.46
(West 1975). See also Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-118 (1980); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 1301.103
(Purdon 1989).
108. The Ohio and Georgia statutes, as written, are very analogous to the Louisiana
statute. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.54 (Page 1975); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9-6 (1971).
They both create a presumption of validity, absent fraudulent misrepresentation, to a
written consent obtained in compliance with the statutory criteria. All three statutes also
require only a general description of the nature of the treatment. The Ohio and Louisiana
statutes, in addition, require a general description of the known risks involved. Under
the Ohio and Louisiana statutes, no evidence is admissible to alter the authorization given
in the written consent form.
See also Iowa Code Ann. § 147.137 (West 1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41A.110 (1987).
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than interpreting the statute as providing an exclusive legislative doctrine
in this area. Absent constitutional claims, these interpretations by the
Ohio and Georgia courts, in contrast to the Hondroulis court, have
respected their legislative pronouncements by construing their statutes
according to their written words and intended purposes.
In 1975, the New York legislature enacted its statute dealing with
"[limitation of medical malpractice action based on lack of informed
consent."' 9 The New York statute provided:
1. Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person
providing the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to
the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably fore-
seeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical prac-
titioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a
manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable eval-
uation .... 110
109. N.Y. [Pub. Health] Law § 2805-d (McKinney 1975).
110. Id. The statute provides:
1. Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person providing the
professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives
thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable
medical practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a
manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.
2. The right of action to recover for medical malpractice based on a lack of
informed consent is limited to those cases involving either (a) non-emergency
treatment, procedure or surgery, or (b) a diagnostic procedure which involved
invasion or disruption of the integrity of the body.
3. For a cause of action therefor it must also be established that a reasonably
prudent person in the patient's condition would not have undergone the treatment
or diagnosis if he had been fully informed and that the lack of informed consent
is a proximate cause of the injury or condition for which recovery is sought.
4. It shall be a defense to any action for medical malpractice based upon an
alleged failure to obtain such an informed consent that:
(a) the risk not disclosed is too commonly known to warrant disclosure;
or
(b) the patient assured the &nedical practitioner he would undergo the
treatment, procedure or diagnosis regardless of the risk involved, or the
patient assured the medical practitioner that he did not want to be
informed of the matters to which he would be entitled to be informed;
or
(c) consent by or on behalf of the patient was not reasonably possible;
or
(d) the medical practitioner, after considering all of the attendant facts
and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent
to which such alternatives or risks were disclosed to the patient because
he reasonably believed that the manner and extent of such disclosure
could reasonably be expected to adversely and substantially affect the
patient's condition.
See also N.Y. [Pub. Health] Law § 2805-d (McKinney Supp. 1990).
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New York has codified the doctrine developed from its common
law on medical informed consent. The statute, through the reasonableness
standard, reiterates the previously established jurisprudential elements
involved in a negligence cause of action for lack of medical informed
consent."' This statute also resembles the jurisprudential rules which
existed in Louisiana prior to the enactment of the Louisiana Uniform
Consent Law in 1975. The Louisiana statute, however, did not codify
the common law doctrine of informed consent but more specifically
provided its own legislative doctrine of informed consent.
The New York courts have reserved the power to interpret the search
and seizure provision of the New York constitution as more expansive
than the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.1"2 Since
the New York statute incorporates the state's prior jurisprudence, the
New York statutory construction may not violate the New York con-
stitution.
The Florida legislature, in 1975, enacted the Florida Medical Consent
Law" 3 which provided a similar codification of the Florida jurisprudential
informed consent doctrine. The Florida Medical Consent Law provided:
(3) No recovery shall be allowed in any court in this state against
any physician ... in an action brought for treating, examining,
or operating on a patient without his informed consent when:
(a) 1 .... obtaining the consent of the patient was in
accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among
members of the medical profession with similar training and
experience in the same or similar medical community; and
2. A reasonable individual ... would have a general un-
derstanding of the procedure, the . . . alternative procedures or
treatments, and the substantial risks and hazards inherent in the
proposed treatment or procedures....
(4)(a) A consent which is evidenced in writing and meets
the requirements of subsection (3) shall, if validly signed by the
patient or another authorized person, be conclusively presumed
to be valid consent. This presumption may be rebutted if there
was a fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact in obtaining
the signature." 4
111. See Nisenholtz v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 126 Misc.2d 658, 483 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup.
1984); Twitchell v. MacKay, 78 A.D.2d 125, 434 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Sup. 1980).
112. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 12 (McKinney). See People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d
296, 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1986), 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, cert. denied 479 U.S. 1091, 107 S.
Ct. 1301 (1987).
113. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.46 (West 1975).
114. Id. This statute provides:
(1) This section shall be known and cited as the "Florida Medical Consent
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida declared that the
Florida statute violated the due process clause by creating a conclusive
presumption of informed consent from the signed, written form.", The
court reasoned that the plaintiff could not prove that the physician
failed to comply with the statutory requirements because the written
consent established a conclusive presumption of informed consent absent
fraud.
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed on the due process ques-
tion.1 6 The court acknowledged that the statute was a mere codification
of the prior common law doctrine of informed consent but held that
the conclusive presumption absent misrepresentation was constitutional.
The supreme court agreed with the court of appeal that evidence of a
Law."
(2) In any medical treatment activity not covered by § 768.13, entitled the
"Good Samaritan Act," this act shall govern.
(3) No recovery shall be allowed in any court in this state against any physician
licensed under chapter 458, osteopath licensed under chapter 459, chiropractor
licensed under chapter 460, podiatrist licensed under chapter 461, or dentist
licensed under chapter 466 in an action brought for treating, examining, or
operating on a patient without his informed consent when:
(a) 1. The action of the physician, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist,
or dentist in obtaining the consent of the patient was in accordance with
an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the medical
profession with similar training and experience in the same or similar
medical community; and
2. A reasonable individual, from the information provided by the
physician, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist, or dentist, under the cir-
cumstances, would have a general understanding of the procedure, the
medically acceptable alternative procedures or treatments, and the sub-
stantial risks and hazards inherent in the proposed treatment or proce-
dures, which are recognized among other physicians, osteopaths,
chiropractors, podiatrists, or dentists in the same or similar community
who perform similar treatment or procedures; or
(b) The patient would reasonably, under all the surrounding circumstances,
have undergone such treatment or procedure had he been advised by the
physician, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist, or dentist in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph (a).
(4)(a) A consent which is evidenced in writing and meets the requirements of
subsection (3) shall, if validly sign by the patient or another authorized person,
be conclusively presumed to be valid consent. This presumption may be rebutted
if there was a fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact in obtaining the
signature.
(b) A valid signature is one which is given by person who under all the
circumstances is mentally and physically competent to give consent.
See also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 766.103 (West Supp. 1990).
115. Cunningham v. Parikh, 472 So. 2d 746 (Fla. App. 5th Dist. 1985), rev'd in part,
493 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1986).
116. Cunningham v. Parikh, 493 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1986).
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signed consent form only does not establish the conclusive presumption
of informed consent absent misrepresentation. The supreme court, on
the other hand, corrected the court of appeal in holding that compliance
with statutory requirements through the written consent form does es-
tablish the conclusive presumption of informed consent absent misrep-
resentation." 7
The Florida statute is similar in construction to the Louisiana statute
because of the presumption established absent misrepresentation upon
a physician's compliance with the statute. The Florida statute, however,
is different in that it sets forth the common law elements of the same
or similar medical community standards into the statute, whereas the
Louisiana statute does not. Thus, compliance with the Florida statute
is also compliance with the prior jurisprudence in Florida, whereas
compliance with the Louisiana statute is not compliance with the prior
Louisiana jurisprudence.
The Florida constitution's search and seizure provision is explicitly
co-extensive with the United States Constitution."" Since the state con-
stitution does not give any more protection than does the federal Con-
stitution, the Florida statutory construction should not violate the Florida
constitution.
In contrast to New York and Florida, Ohio in 1975 passed its
medical informed consent statute' 19 which provided a legislative doctrine
of informed consent superseding the prior jurisprudence. The statute
provided:
Written consent to a surgical or medical procedure or course
of procedures shall, to the extent that it fulfills all the require-
ments in divisions (A), (B), and (C) of this section, be presumed
to be valid and effective, in the absence of proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the person who sought such
consent was not acting in good faith, or that the execution of
the consent was induced by fraudulent misrepresentation of ma-
terial facts .... Except as herein provided, no evidence shall
be admissible to impeach, modify, or limit the authorization for
performance of the procedure or procedures set forth in such
written consent.
(A) The consent sets forth in general terms the nature and
117. Id.
The physician could establish the presumption by complying with the statute through
the written consent form by adequately explaining to the patient the procedure, possible
alternatives, and the substantial risks involved. Once the physician established the elements
of a valid consent, the patient could rebut the presumption only by a showing of
misrepresentation.
118. Fla. Const. art. 1, § 12. See Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988).
119. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.54 (Page 1975).
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purpose of the procedure or procedures, and what the procedures
are expected to accomplish, together with the reasonably known
risks, and, except in emergency situations, sets forth the names
of the physicians who shall perform the intended surgical pro-
cedures .... 20
The Trumbull County Court of Appeal of Ohio interpreted the
statute in the case of Dodson v. Olcese.12 1 The jury granted the physician
summary judgment and the patient appealed. The patient alleged that
the trial judge committed error by instructing the jury that the signed
120. Id. The statute provides:
A hospital shall not be held liable for a physician's failure to obtain an
informed consent from his patient prior to a surgical or medical procedure or
course of procedures, unless the physician is an employee of the hospital.
Written consent to a surgical or medical procedure or course of procedures
shall, to the extent that it fulfills all the requirements in divisions (A), (B), and
(C) of this section, be presumed to be valid and effective, in the absence of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the person who sought such
consent was not acting in good faith, or that the execution of the consent was
induced by fraudulent misrepresentation of material facts, or that the person
executing the consent was not able to communicate effectively in spoken and
written English or any other language in which the consent is written. Except
as herein provided, no evidence shall be admissible to impeach, modify, or limit
the authorization for performance of the procedure or procedures set forth in
such written consent.
(A) The consent sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose of the
procedure or procedures, and what the procedures are expected to accomplish,
together with the reasonably known risks, and, except in emergency situations,
sets forth the names of the physicians who shall perform the intended surgical
procedures.
(B) The person making the consent acknowledges that such disclosure of
information has been made and that all questions asked about the procedure
or procedures have been answered in a satisfactory manner.
(C) The consent is signed by the patient for whom the procedure is to be
performed, or, if the patient for any reason including, but not limited to,
competence, infancy, or the fact that, at the latest time that the consent is
needed, the patient is under the influence of alcohol, hallucinogens, or drugs,
lacks legal capacity to consent, by a person who has legal authority to consent
on behalf of such patient in such circumstances.
Any use of a consent form that fulfills the requirements stated in divisions
(A), (B), and (C) of this section has no effect on the common law rights and
liabilities, including the right of a physician to obtain the oral or implied consent
of a patient to a medical procedure, that may exist as between physicians and
patients on July 28, 1975.
As used in this section, the term "hospital" has the meaning set forth in
division (D) of section 2305.11 of the Revised Code. The provisions of this
division apply to hospitals, doctors of medicine, doctors of osteopathic medicine,
and doctors of podiatric medicine.
See also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. .§ 2317.54 (Page Supp. 1989).
121. Dodson v. Olcese, No. 3733, slip op. (Ohio App. Sept. 30, 1987).
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written consent form is valid and effective unless the person who sought
the written consent did not act in good faith or obtained the written
consent by misrepresenting material facts. 122 The appellate court approved
the trial court's instructions and affirmed the judgment. The appellate
court, in addition, rejected the patient's allegation that the written
consent form must particularize the risks involved in the procedures.
The court held that such a claim ignores the language of the statute
which provides that the physician must set forth the reasonably known
risks in "general terms." In Dodson, the written consent form, therefore,
need not specifically describe infection as a risk of the particular op-
eration involved in the suit but only as a general risk of any operation.
Continuing to reject the plaintiff's assignments of error, the appellate
court held that the physician could present standardized forms and that
specific, individual forms for each patient were not necessary. If the
use of standardized forms were prohibited by requiring personalized
forms, as the plaintiff argued, the underlying purpose of the statute
would have been rendered meaningless by eliminating the presumption
created by the statute.
The Ohio courts have interpreted the Ohio constitution as co-ex-
tensive with the federal constitution. 23 The similar wording of the Ohio
and Louisiana statutes suggests that the courts should interpret the
statutes similarly. Since the right to privacy under the Louisiana con-
stitution, however, goes beyond that provided in the Ohio constitution,
an Ohio statutory interpretation in Louisiana may violate the Louisiana
constitution. The difference in the extent of the right to privacy between
Ohio and Louisiana suggests the different statutory interpretations.
The Georgia medical informed consent statute, 24 as enacted in 1971,
also parallels the language of the Louisiana statute. The Georgia statute
provided:
(d) A consent to surgical or medical treatment which discloses
in general terms the treatment or course of treatment in con-
nection with which it is given and which is duly evidenced in
writing and signed by the patient or other person or persons
authorized to consent pursuant to the terms of this chapter shall
be conclusively presumed to be a valid consent in the absence
122. The third exception to a valid written consent, that the person executing the
consent form was not able to communicate effectively in written and spoken English, did
not apply in this case. Id.
123. Ohio Const. art. 1, § 14. See State v. Geraldo, 429 N.E.2d 141, 68 Ohio St.2d
120 (1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 962, 102 S. Ct. 2038 (1982).
124. Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9-6 (1971).
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of fraudulent misrepresentations of material facts in obtaining
the same.' 2
Georgia courts consistently have interpreted the statute literally. The
statute requires only that the physician disclose in general terms the
proposed treatment in order to effect a valid consent absent evidence
of fraudulent misrepresentations. 176 The statute does not include a duty
to disclose risks of treatment, and the courts will not sustain an action
alleging a breach of duty based either on a failure to warn of the risks
involved or that the consent was thereby invalid. 27 The only basis for
overcoming the conclusive presumption of informed consent is by proof
of fraudulent misrepresentations. Mere allegations of fraud, however,
which are met by opposing affidavits will result in summary judgment
for the physician. 2s In enacting the statute in 1971, Georgia specifically
rejected the traditional jurisprudential doctrine of informed consent and
supplanted it with a legislatively enacted doctrine of medical informed
consent.129
Georgia courts have interpreted the search and seizure provision of
the Georgia constitution also as co-extensive with the federal Consti-
tution.130 The difference in interpretation of similar statutes between
125. Id. The statute provides:
(a) This chapter shall be liberally construed, and all relationships set forth
herein shall include the adoptive, foster, and step relations as well as blood
relations and the relationship by common-law marriage as well as ceremonial
marriage.
(b) A consent by one person authorized and empowered to consent to surgical
or medical treatment shall be sufficient.
(c) Any person acting in good faith shall be justified in relying on the
representations of any person purporting to give consent, including, but not
limited to, his identity, his age, his marital status, his emancipation, and his
relationship to any other person for whom the consent is purportedly given.
(d) A consent to surgical or medical treatment which discloses in general terms
the treatment or course of treatment in connection with which it is given and
which is duly evidenced in writing and signed by the patient or other persons
or persons authorized to consent pursuant to the terms of this chapter shall be
conclusively presumed to be a valid consent in the absence of fraudulent mis-
representations of material facts in obtaining the same.
See also Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9-6 (Supp. 1989).
126. Fox v. Cohen, 160 Ga. App. 270, 287 S.E.2d 272 (1981); Parr v. Palmyra Park
Hosp., Inc., 139 Ga. App. 457, 228 S.E.2d 596 (1976); Kenney v. Piedmont Hosp., 136
Ga. App. 660, 222 S.E.2d 162 (1975); Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App. 737, 222 S.E.2d
113 (1975).
127. Fox, 160 Ga. App. at 270, 287 S.E.2d at 272; Parr, 139 Ga. App. at 457, 228
S.E.2d at 596; Kenney, 136 Ga. App. at 660, 222 S.E.2d at 162; Young, 136 Ga. App.
at 737, 222 S.E.2d at 113.
128. See Cole v. Jordan, 161 Ga. App. 409, 288 S.E.2d 260 (1982).
129. See Parr, 139 Ga. App. at 457, 228 S.E.2d at 596.




Georgia and Louisiana again may reflect the difference in the extent of
the privacy right between the Geoigia constitution and the Louisiana
constitution.
Analyzing the wording of the informed consent statutes in various
states is important in understanding the appropriate construction of
Louisiana's own statute. Arguably the different state courts would in-
terpret similar statutes similarly. The application of each state's own
constitution, however, may account for the differences in the various
states' interpretations of similar statutes. Thus, although the Hondroulis
interpretation of Louisiana's informed consent statute is inconsistent
with the interpretations of similar statutes by other states, this incon-
sistency may reflect the proper incorporation of our constitutional right
to privacy into the area of medical informed consent.
IV. EVALUATION
When resolving a case which involves a statute, the court should
attempt first to interpret the statute in a manner which protects its
constitutionality but still gives the statute its intended purpose and effect.
When considering a statute's constitutionality, the court should be cog-
nizant of the relationship between the legislature's duty to enact the law
and the judiciary's duty to interpret that law. The court, in addition,
should consider the relationship between an individual's constitutionally
protected area of personal freedom, which the court should protect from
legislative encroachment, and the legislature's duty to govern its citizens,
which the court should respect through judicial deference.
A. Statutory Interpretations Which Avoid the Constitutional Issue
Other interpretations of the Uniform Consent Law attempt to con-
strue the statute in a manner which avoids the constitutional tension.
If the right to privacy exists in medical informed consent, these statutory
interpretations fail in accounting for this constitutional right, lending
more credence to the Hondroulis interpretation.
Judge Lobrano in his concurring opinion in the court of appeals'
decision in Hondroulis provided an alternative interpretation. 3 ' Judge
Lobrano pointed out that, although LaCaze held that the statute su-
persedes the jurisprudential rules, compliance with the statute is still a
matter of interpretation by the courts. He believed a reasonable inter-
pretation of the statute is that it requires information of known risks
in the specific categories set out. If there is a known risk of injury to
a particular organ or limb associated with a particular surgical operation,
131. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 521 So. 2d 534, 536 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd 553
So. 2d 398 (1988).
[Vol. 51
COMMENTS
the patient should be informed about it. To hold otherwise would lead
to the absurd result that a physician can merely copy the language of
the statute for every surgical operation even though each operation
involves different risks.3 2
Perhaps, this rationale is more advisable than that chosen by the
supreme court in Hondroulis because it relegates the judicial authority
to statute interpretation by deciding whether a case fulfills that statute
rather than a constitutional interpretation by rendering the statute un-
constitutional. This rationale, on the other hand, may destroy the stability
the legislature intended to give physicians by permitting the physicians
to describe generally the risks involved. To require specificity would also
lead to the absurd result of listing every conceivable risk involved in
order to ensure security from liability. In addition, this interpretation
could have the same effect as the unconstitutional interpretation by the
supreme court in Hondroulis because by requiring specificity the cause
of action reverts back to the prior jurisprudential rules and a fact-
finding contest which would eliminate the statutorily provided pre-
sumption.
Another interpretation, advanced by Justice Blanche's concurrence
in LaCaze, suggests that the statute provides only an evidentiary rule,
creating a presumption of informed consent but leaving the jurispru-
dential rules intact.'33 This theory suggests that Subsection A provides
a procedure to obtain a written informed consent which is granted the
presumption of validity. Subsection B, read together with Subsection A,
provides an evidentiary rule which prohibits the admission of parol
testimony to alter the written document. 3 4 A written statutory consent,
therefore, carries an irrebuttable presumption absent misrepresentation,
which prohibits alteration by parol evidence. Justice Blanche also stated
that noncompliance with the statute does not create a cause of action
because the statute is only one means of obtaining informed consent
due to the evidentiary focus of the rule excluding all other evidence. 3
Cases in which the physician does not obtain consent in accordance
with the statute fall back into the prior rules developed by the courts
for determining whether the physician obtained a valid informed con-
sent.
36
132. Id. at 538.
133. LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039, 1050 (Blanche, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 1051. The amendment, adding Subsection (C) to permit oral informed
consents, extended the evidentiary presumption of the written consent of Subsection (A)
to physicians who could not obtain written consents but only oral ones. An oral statutory
consent carried an irrebuttable presumption absent misrepresentation, which permitted
alteration according to the rules of evidence in ordinary cases but only in an attempt to
prove statutory noncompliance.
135. Id. at 1051.
136. Id. at 1052.
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Justice Blanche's statutory construction maintains the statute's in-
dependence from the prior jurisprudence. With the incorporation of the
privacy issue since LaCaze, this evidentiary interpretation, however, could
not sustain a similar constitutional attack. Cases in medical informed
consent which arose by complying with the statute would create the
presumption and preclude the patient from admitting evidence to over-
come it. The patient's privacy interest, incorporated in Hondroulis, would
prohibit this interpretation. This interpretation, in addition, would permit
the cases which were not in compliance with the statute to sustain a
constitutional attack because the jurisprudence would govern them-the
same result as in Hondroulis.
Another author proposes that the Hondroulis court should have
interpreted the statute to provide a rebuttable presumption of a valid
informed consent, instead of a rebuttable presumption of a valid con-
sent.' 7 This occurs when the written form complies with parts (a), (b),
and (c) of Subsection A of the statute. Although all the material in-
formation may not be disclosed on the written form, the patient ac-
knowledges the disclosure of other information outside the written form
through part (b) of the statute, which is included on the written form.
The statutory presumption is maintained through the use of the general
consent form. If the general consent form, however, does not adequately
disclose the material information, the patient could overcome the pre-
sumption through other communication outside the written form which
proves the lack of disclosure.'38
This interpretation of the statute would properly permit the statute
to govern the informed consent field instead of the consent field. This
interpretation, however, fails to consider Subsection B which excludes
the admissibility of any evidence, except evidence of fraud, to modify
or limit the authorization in the written consent form. With the admission
of evidence outside the written form, the rebuttable presumption provided
by the statute is circumvented. The protection given to the physician
through the written form is thus negated.
B. Autonomy Rights and Policy Concerns
Many courts faced with right to die cases recognized the power and
authority of the judiciary to decide such issues, even in the absence or
presence of legislative action. 3 9 These courts, however, further under-
137. Note, Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher: The Crusade Back to Canterbury, 50 La. L.
Rev. 1195 (1990).
138. Id.
139. Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987);
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter,
362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1978), aff'd 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re
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stood that medical issues involved moral, ethical, social, medical, and
legal considerations which made the issues not well-suited for resolution
in an adversarial judiciary proceeding. These issues are more suitably
addressed by the state legislature which has the resources necessary to
gather and synthesize the vast quantities of information needed to for-
mulate guidelines in these areas. Only the legislature can deal with these
issues in a way which will best accommodate the rights and interests
of the people of the state.14°
The Louisiana legislature, by enacting the Uniform Consent Law,
has acted to provide for the area of medical informed consent. The
legislature, rather than the courts, is in a better position to assess the
needs and interests of the people. The courts, on the other hand, should
not always sit by passively in the face of legislative action because a
constitution would be meaningless without some responsible authority
to ensure its viability.
Constitutions seek to define the appropriate role of government while
protecting an individual's right to personal freedom. Article 1 of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 is titled the "Declaration of Rights" as
it contains the protected individual rights. The judiciary is the mechanism
to uphold the individual liberties guaranteed in article 1 and protect an
individual against invasions of his constitutional rights. In the face of
legislative encroachment, the court should not neglect its judicial duty
to protect its litigants against deprivations of these granted constitutional
rights. The court, on the other hand, should not abuse this authority
and "discover" or "create" rights which have no constitutional legiti-
macy.
V. CONCLUSION
Some evidence exists to support the Hondroulis court's findings that
article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana constitution contains a right to
privacy regarding medical informed consent. The Louisiana constitution
does provide greater protection than the federal Constitution in the area
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647 (N.J.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 922, 97 S. Ct. 319 (1976); In re Guardianship of Hamlin,
102 Wash.2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984); In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash.2d
114, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983), rev'd on other grounds 102 Wash.2d 810, 689 P.2d
1372 (Wash. 1984). Compare Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
140. Rasmussen by Mitchell, 154 Ariz. at 225, 741 P.2d at 692; Severns, 421 A.2d
at 1346; Satz, 379 So. 2d at 360; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 343-46, 486 A.2d at 1220-
21; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 50-51, 355 A.2d at 669; In re Guardianship of Hamlin,
102 Wash.2d at 822, 689 P.2d at 1379; In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash.2d at 139,
660 P.2d at 752. Compare Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
758-59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434-35 (Mass. 1977).
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of right to privacy. This is evidenced by the language in article 1, section
5 which reads "[e]very person shall be secure ... against unreasonable
•.. invasions of privacy." This provision is understood to incorporate
explicitly the right to privacy decision of Griswold v. Connecticut4 into
the Louisiana constitution. The constitutional convention proceedings
regarding section 5 contain some indication of an intent to expand the
privacy right into non-criminal areas of the law.
The Louisiana Constitution in article 1, section 20, which declares
that "no law shall subject any person to euthanasia," further suggests
that the constitution explicitly recognizes an individual's right to reject
medical treatment. Furthermore, other states' differing interpretations
of similar informed consent statutes may be attributed to the greater
privacy right in the Louisiana constitution, which supports the Hon-
droulis interpretation of the Uniform Consent Law.
This evidence provides a foundation for the Louisiana Supreme Court
to incorporate an individual's right to privacy into the medical informed
consent field. Even if a Louisiana constitutional right to privacy exists
with regard to medical informed consent, the statute may only impinge
upon this right and not unduly burden it. The statute would then
withstand federal, and perhaps state, constitutional scrutiny as it is
reasonably drawn to meet rational state interests.
At first glance, the court used the Louisiana constitutional right to
privacy provision as a catapult into the medical informed consent area
in order to supersede the legislature's Uniform Consent Law which
governed this area. Although, the court should guard against using a
constitutional provision in order to act as a "good samaritan" to reach
a fair and equitable result in emotionally trying cases, this comment
shows that the court's right to privacy tour de force into the medical
informed consent area has some support and may be justified.
Neil C. Abramson
141. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
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